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In October 2008, the first economic partnership agreement (EPA) was signed between 
the European Union (EU) and its member states, and the states of the CARIFORUM 
region.1 The ongoing negotiations and, in certain instances, signature of interim 
economic partnership agreements2 between the EU and its member states, on the one 
hand, and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) groupings of States, on the other, 
signals an important – it might even be said seismic – shift in EU-ACP relations.3 The 
CARIFORUM states are part of the ACP grouping, which comprises of 79 states in 
total and includes some of the poorest developing countries around the world.4 In many 
 
* Both of the School of Law, University of Sheffield, United Kingdom (p.cardwell@sheffield.ac.uk & 
d.french@sheffield.ac.uk). 
1 Economic Partnership Agreement between the CARIFORUM States of the one part, and the European 
Community and its Member States, of the other part, 15 October 2008, [2008] O.J. L289/I/3 
[CARIFORUM-EU EPA]. 
2 For updates on the status of all current negotiations, see EC, Regional Negotiations of Economic 
Partnership Agreements, online: EC  
<http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/regions/acp/regneg_en.htm>. 
3 Development policy and agreements with third states are conducted on the basis of the competence of 
the European Community, one of the three “pillars” of the European Union. Similarly, membership of 
the WTO is of the European Communities. References to the European Economic Community (EEC) 
and the European Community (EC) in this chapter are retained for the pre-1992 period. 
4 The ACP grouping of states is comprised as follows. As regards Africa, these are states, geographically 
speaking, found in sub-Saharan Africa (but not North Africa) and surrounding island states (for example, 
Cape Verde, Mauritius, Madagascar and the Seychelles). Somalia is considered to be one of the least 
developed ACP states, though it has not signed the Cotonou Agreement. South Africa is an ACP 
participant but has a separate EU cooperation agreement. In the Caribbean, all independent island states 
are included (except Cuba, which was admitted to the ACP group in 2000 but which has not signed the 
Cotonou Agreement) and the non-island states of Belize, Suriname and Guyana. The Pacific states are 
comprised of 15 mainly island states/archipelagos, the largest in size being Papua New Guinea. 
Developing countries elsewhere in Asia and the Asia-Pacific region are not part of ACP. For up-to-date 
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ways, the legal and political ties that have developed between the EU and ACP over the 
last fifty years are an excellent example of the paradox that lies at the heart of North-
South relations, more generally. Though the EU-ACP relationship is often promoted – 
principally by the EU – as a model of mutual and benign cooperation between 
developed and developing countries, in reality the relationship has been much more 
fractious.5 In particular, whereas the EU has sought to utilise its links with ACP States 
as one of the cornerstones of its external relations policy and, more specifically, to 
establish its own particular development assistance model, the ACP states continue to 
struggle to achieve true equality of bargaining position within the relationship, so as to 
maximise their own political, governance and sustainable economic development 
outcomes.  Provisions on investment have in recent years come to the forefront and 
represent, in many ways, the new frontiers of the economic relationship between the 
EU and the ACP grouping.  
 
This chapter analyses the synergies and tensions within the EU-ACP partnership within 
the context of one specific aspect of the CARIFORUM-EU EPA, namely its provisions 
on investment liberalisation. As is well understood, international rules on foreign direct 
investment have proved one of the most complex and contested issues within 
international economic relations, spanning back over a number of decades. Attempts to 
create multilateral agreements on investment have failed.6 And though the general 
 
information on the ACP grouping, see Secretariat of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, 
online: <http://www.acpsec.org/index.htm>. 
5 K. Arts & A. Dickson, “EU Development Cooperation: From Model to Symbol?” in K. Arts & A. 
Dickson, eds., EU Development Cooperation: From Model to Symbol (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2004) at 3: “development cooperation policy in relation to the ACP has become a 
symbolic gesture from the EU, primarily useful to demonstrate its breadth of commitment to, and 
relationship with, the South.” 
6 T. Eilmansberger, “Bilateral Investment Treaties and EU Law” (2009) 46 Common Market L. Rev. 
383. 
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approach towards such investment has changed dramatically since the 1980s,7 this 
chapter will show that significant divergences in approach remain. Even within a region 
such as the Caribbean where foreign direct investment is, on the whole, actively 
encouraged, a rule-based system of investment liberalisation is not without its 
challenges. The chapter will begin, however, by seeking to place such treaty activity in 
context, first through an analysis of EU-ACP relations and second, through a general 




The EU’s relationships with states in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific are an 
inherent part of the external dimension of the European integration process. At the time 
of the signature of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, some of the then six member states of 
the EEC,8 principally Belgium and France, were yet to embark on a comprehensive 
decolonisation programme. Pre-independence territories in Africa and elsewhere were 
accorded the status of “associated territories” in the EEC Treaty with preferential access 
to the markets of other EEC member states.9 Member states were obliged to apply the 
same rules to commercial exchanges with the associated territories as to other member 
states.10 The EEC Treaty also laid down the requirement for member states to 
“contribute to the investments required by the progressive development of these 
countries and territories”.11 
 
7 A. Lowenfeld, International Economic Law, 2d ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) at 468. 
8 Namely, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.  
9 Article 131-6 EEC (original text). The “countries and territories” concerned were listed in Annex IV to 
the original EEC Treaty. These covered much of West and Equatorial Africa (France and Belgium), 
settlements in Oceania and the Pacific (France), Netherlands New Guinea and Somaliland (under Italian 
administration). 
10 Article 132(2) EEC (original text). 
11 Article 132(3) EEC (original text). 
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Following the independence of most French and Belgian sub-Saharan African states in 
1960, the 1963 Yaoundé Convention between the EEC, its member states and 19 newly 
independent states was signed. This association agreement, concluded for five years 
and renewed in 1969, continued the preferential and reciprocal trade access between 
the EEC and associated states. It also created the European Development Fund (EDF) 
as a supplementary source of finance,12 and it established common institutions: an 
Association Council, Parliamentary Conference and Arbitration Court.13 The Yaoundé 
Convention set the template for EU-ACP relations to this day. In 1974, following UK 
accession to the EEC and the expiry of the second Yaoundé Convention, the first Lomé 
Convention came into being, substantially enlarging the participating states to include 
former British colonies.14 The ACP group was thus born, and the Lomé Convention 
was renewed on four successive occasions in 1979, 1984, 1990 and 1995. This 
demonstrated, on the one hand, the EU’s general preference for a region-based 
approach to its external relations and, on the other, a bespoke European approach to 
North-South relations during the Cold War.15 
 
The Lomé Conventions granting preferential trade relations on a non-reciprocal basis 
were designed to be more beneficial to the ACP states than the Generalised System of 
Preferences (GSP) which, alongside access to the EDF, was intended to promote a 
more-rounded development model within ACP states. Evidence suggests, however, that 
 
12 Yaoundé Convention, 20 July 1963, [1964] O.J. 93/1431, Articles 16-17. 
13 Ibid. at Articles 39-53. 
14 For these states, many of whom had been sceptical of the preferential system of preferences accorded 
through part IV of the EEC Treaty, had already negotiated bilateral agreements with the EEC in the late 
1960s. See J. Mayall, “The Shadow of Empire: the EU and the former Colonial World” in C. Hill & M. 
Smith, eds., International Relations and the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 
at 296. 
15 G. Edwards, “The Patterns of the EU’s Global Activity” in Hill & Smith, ibid. at 44; S. Meunier & K. 
Nicolaïdis, “The European Union as a Trade Power” in Hill & Smith, ibid. at 264. 
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such mechanisms did little to increase actual trade between the EU and the ACP states.16 
Additional incentives to help stabilise rapidly falling prices in agricultural and mineral 
commodities (STABEX and MINEX) were created in 1979 and 1984 respectively.17 
The existence of these helped to reaffirm the preferential nature of the EU-ACP 
economic relationship, and though not in the spirit of multilateralism of the GATT, 
fulfilled a political purpose for the EU (and, in turn, the US) in dissuading the ACP 
states from pursuing closer ties with the Soviet Union. 
 
It was only in the post-Cold War global context that the content of the EU-ACP 
agreements began to diversify. Against the background of the creation of the European 
Union in the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, which included provisions on foreign policy 
so as to improve the EU’s presence on the world stage, the content of the final Lomé 
Convention18 (1995) and Cotonou Agreement19 (2000) was adapted to include 
provisions on human rights. This was linked to the EU’s promotion of itself 
internationally as the “friend” of the developing world with whom it shares solidarity20 
whilst affirming a strong commitment to the protection of human rights and an apparent 
willingness to tie the incentives and advantages given to its partners more closely to 
their domestic politics.21 In the case that one of the parties fails to fulfil an obligation 
 
16 Mayall, supra note 14 at 307. 
17 Ibid. at 306. 
18 Revised Fourth Lomé Convention, 4 November 1995, [1998] O.J. L156/3. 
19 Partnership Agreement between the Members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States 
of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, 23 June 2000, 
[2000] O.J. L317/3 [Cotonou Agreement] 
20 See EC, European Consensus on Development – Joint statement by the Council and the 
representatives of the governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European 
Parliament and the Commission on European Union Development Policy: ‘The European Consensus’, 
24 February 2006, [2006] O.J. C 46/01, online: EC 
<http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/european_consensus_2005_en.pdf> at para. 55.  
21 Cotonou Agreement Articles 9 (political dialogue) and 96 (consultation procedure on human rights). 
See also K. Arts, “ACP-EU Relations in a New Era: The Cotonou Agreement” (2003) 40 Common 
Market L. Rev. 95. 
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relating to the respect for human rights, democratic principles or the rule of law, a 
consultation procedure can be initiated, followed by “appropriate measures” to be taken 
if necessary. Suspension of the agreement can occur as a last resort.22 
 
Yet, the lack of definition of the human rights and good governance agenda – often 
referring to the need for “transparency”, “inclusiveness” and a “process approach” 
within the strategy papers applying to each country – point to the dominant position of 
the EU in setting the agenda in such negotiations.23 This approach of including non-
trade issues in agreements, whilst suiting the EU’s internal decision-making processes, 
has been criticised on differing grounds by both proponents of liberal trade economics 
and developing countries as an over-burdensome obstacle to progress in liberalising 
trade.24 
 
Elsewhere, the EU’s 2006 Consensus on Development contains commitments to 
promoting “effective multilateralism” and “common values of … respect for human 
rights, fundamental freedoms, peace [and]democracy.”25 Furthermore, there is a strong 
belief that “[d]eveloping countries have the primary responsibility for creating an 
enabling domestic environment for mobilising their own resources, including 
conducting coherent and effective policies.”26 The synergy between the EU’s view of 
how development aid should be used and the direction of the Lomé Convention and 
Cotonou Agreement thus becomes much clearer. It should also be noted that the ACP 
 
22 Article 96. A similar provision, Article 97, covers consultation in instances of alleged corruption. 
23 P. Leino, “The Journey Towards All that is Good and Beautiful: Human Rights and ‘Common Values’ 
as Guiding Principles of EU Foreign Relations Law” in M. Cremona & B. de Witte, eds., EU Foreign 
Relations Law: Constitutional Fundamentals (Oxford: Hart, 2008) at 278. 
24 S. Woolcock, “Trade Policy: From Uruguay to Doha and Beyond” in W. Wallace, H. Wallace & M. 
A. Pollack, eds., Policy-Making in the European Union, 5th ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 
at 396. 
25 Supra note 20 at para. 13.   
26 Ibid. at para. 14. 
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States are, comparatively speaking, far less significant in economic terms for the EU 
than was the case in 1975. Neither do they stand as the States which benefit the most 
from preferential agreements, having gradually been displaced by non-EU States in 
Europe and around the Mediterranean.27 As such, some have stated that the ACP 
agreements no longer justify the almost exclusive focus accorded to them in studies of 
the EU’s relations with the developing world.28  
 
In any event, the need to reform the content of the EU-ACP agreement was prompted 
by the adverse decisions in GATT and the WTO during the 1990s which related to the 
disputes over the EU’s banana imports.29 The Cotonou Agreement therefore 
represented a significant break from the past, most notably in mandating that, because 
the preferential trade relations were incompatible with the same states’ obligations 
under WTO rules,30 they were to be replaced with EPAs premised upon reciprocity of 
 
27 Pre-enlargement states in Central and Eastern Europe concluded “Europe Agreements” which 
facilitated their eventual entry into the EU in 2004 and 2007. The EU has concluded bilateral Association 
Agreements with all the states who participate in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. These include 
North African states (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt), states in the Middle East (Lebanon, Jordan, 
Syria, Israel) and an interim agreement with the Palestinian Authority. Turkey is also a participant in 
EuroMed but has a separate agreement and customs union with the EU. It continues to pursue full 
membership negotiations. 
28 C. Stevens, “The EU-ACP Relationship after Lomé” in P. van Dijk &G. Faber, eds., The External 
Economic Dimension of the European Union (The Hague: Kluwer, 2000) at 223. 
29 GATT, EEC – Import Regime for Bananas, GATT Doc. DS38/R, [1994] ILM 177. This report was 
not adopted by the contracting parties (an essential procedure in pre-WTO GATT) but further challenges 
after the entry into force of the WTO Agreement by Latin American states (supported by the United 
States) led the EU to finally adopt a WTO-compatible regime in 2001: , EC – Regime for the Importation, 
Sale and Distribution of Bananas – Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution (2 July 2001), WTO Doc. 
WT/DS27/58; EC – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas – Recourse to 
Arbitration by the EC under Article 22.6 of the DSU, (9 April 1999), WTO Doc. WT/DS27/ARB; and 
EC – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas – Recourse to Article 21.5 by 
Ecuador (12 April 1999), WTO Doc. WT/DS27/RW/ECU.  The relevant EU measure is Council 
Regulation 2587/2001 of 19 December 2001 amending Regulation (EEC) No 404/93 on the common 
organization of the market in bananas: [2001] O.J. L 345/13. For a comprehensive account of the 
challenges to the EU banana regime, see P. Eeckhout, External Relations of the European Union (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004) at 381-391. 
30 Article 36(1) Cotonou Agreement: “In view of the objectives and principles set out above, the Parties 
agree to conclude new World Trade Organisation (WTO) compatible trading arrangements, removing 
progressively barriers to trade between them and enhancing cooperation in all areas relevant to trade.” 
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treatment. The original date foreseen for their replacement was 1 January 2008.31 The 
EPAs are to be negotiated with the ACP states organised largely through six regional 
blocs: the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Communauté 
Economique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale (CEMAC), Eastern and Southern 
Africa (ESA), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Caribbean 
(CARIFORUM), and the Pacific group. 
 
C.	 The	 Cotonou	 Agreement:	 “Trade	 or	 Development”,	
“Trade	 and	 Development”	 or	 “Development	 through	
Trade”?	
 
Given the long history of the EU-ACP partnership, the colonial/post-colonial context 
of relationships between the EU member states and ACP states and the continued and 
widening gap between rich and poor, characterising the Cotonou Agreement as 
primarily a tool for development suits the EU’s projection of itself as the protector of 
the developing world against the forces of globalization. Yet, the EU and its member 
states remain at the forefront of the international trading system and were instrumental 
in the creation of the WTO. Given these potentially diverging forces, much can be 
garnered from understanding the emphasis of EU competence in the area. As with other 
areas of EU external relations policy, the internal division of competences in the EU 
institutions is telling. Under the original EEC Treaty, provisions on development fell 
within trade provisions and competence relating to what is now Article 133 on the 
common commercial policy. The Maastricht Treaty in 1992 created specific provisions 
on development, with Article 177 of the revised EC Treaty reading as follows: 
 
31 This was the first day after the end of the WTO waiver (Decision of 14 November 2001) which 
temporarily legitimised the EU-ACP preferential trade relationship. 
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“1.    Community policy in the sphere of development cooperation, which 
shall be complementary to the policies pursued by the member States, shall 
foster: 
 
- the sustainable economic and social development of the developing 
countries, and more particularly the most disadvantaged among them, 
 
- the smooth and gradual integration of the developing countries into the 
world economy, 
 
- the campaign against poverty in the developing countries. 
2.   Community policy in this area shall contribute to the general objective 
of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and to that 
of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms.” 
 
However, this is not the legal basis for the Cotonou Agreement, which is instead found 
in Article 310 EC, a general provision which states that “the Community may conclude 
with one or more States or international organisations agreements establishing an 
association involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and special 
procedure.”32 However, it is worth noting that the legal basis of the CARIFORUM-EU 
EPA is Article 133, the common commercial policy, which thus points to trade – and 
not necessarily development – as the principal basis of the EU competence for these 
new breed of partnership agreements.33 
 
The EU has asserted that, notwithstanding the removal of trade preferences and, more 
generally, the move towards reciprocity, such EPAs would continue to incorporate a 
 
32 As per EC, Council Decision 2003/159/EC of 19 December 2002 concerning the conclusion of the 
Partnership Agreement between the African Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, of the one part, and 
the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000, 
[2000] O.J. L 65/27. 
33 EC, Council Decision 2008/805/EC of 15 July 2008 on the signature and provisional application of 
the Economic Partnership Agreement between the CARIFORUM States, of the one part, and the 
European Community and its Member States, of the other part, [2008] O.J. L 289/I/1. 
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significant developmental focus. As the Cotonou Agreement stated, “[n]egotiations 
shall take account of the level of development and the socio-economic impact of trade 
measures on ACP countries, and their capacity to adapt and adjust their economies to 
the liberalisation process.”34 This flexibility is to be achieved in numerous ways, though 
the principal device is the entrenchment of “asymmetrical reciprocity” within the legal 
texts. In other words, though EPAs are to be premised upon ACP states opening up 
their markets to the EU, this will be done more gradually and more slowly than the EU 
will open its own markets to ACP states. Whether such asymmetrical reciprocity is 
compatible with WTO rules, specifically Article XXIV GATT on regional trade 
agreements (RTAs), remains uncertain. The Cotonou Agreement itself recognises that 
the EU and ACP Parties will have to collaborate in the WTO “with a view to defending 
the arrangements reached, in particular with regard to the degree of flexibility 
available.”35 This is hardly a cast-iron guarantee of WTO-compatibility, though any 
challenge will depend on the likelihood of a WTO member indirectly engaging the 
legality of the EPA during a dispute brought before the WTO’s dispute settlement 
mechanisms36 or, much more likely, seeking to question the EPA during discussions in 
the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements. 
 
Moreover, the issue of WTO compatibility is just one amongst a broad array of 
questions that have arisen around the negotiation and conclusion of EPAs. Of particular 
note is the rather one-sided and heavy-handed way in which the European Commission 
is alleged to have conducted the negotiations. The EU’s commitment to completing 
 
34 Article 37(7) Cotonou Agreement. 
35 Article 37(8) Cotonou Agreement. 
36 Moreover, as Eeckhout notes, the WTO banana dispute (and in particular the US support for Latin 
American countries) was motivated as much by the private interests of US-based banana producers as 
the states concerned: Eeckhout, supra note 29 at 388. 
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EPAs within such a short timeframe, and the inclusion of a wider range of issues than 
just trade, has been criticised both by commentators and many ACP states themselves. 
As a 2005 British Parliamentary report on EPA negotiations commented, “The 
relationship between the EU and the ACP has never been an equal one. This has not 
changed in the negotiations for the Economic Partnership Agreements.”37 The ACP 
Council of Ministers put it more forcefully in 2007 when it noted that “Ministers 
deplore the enormous pressure that has been brought to bear on the ACP States by the 
European Commission to initial the interim trade arrangements, contrary to the spirit of 
the ACP-EU partnership,”38 and further that “Ministers observed that European 
Union’s mercantilist interests have taken precedence over the ACP’s developmental 
and regional integration interests.”39 Similarly, the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary 
Assembly in April 2009 noted that only the CARIFORUM grouping had signed an EPA 
but that the European Commission was pushing ahead, without a full opportunity for 
the ACP states to discuss “contentious clauses”.40 The Assembly resolution stated that 
“neither the conclusion nor the renunciation of an EPA should lead to a situation where 
an ACP country may find itself in a less favourable position that it was under the trade 
provisions of the Cotonou Agreement.”41 
 
This point is symptomatic of an over-arching question as to the relationship between 
the trade liberalisation model proposed by the EU for the EPAs and ACP development. 
Even if one accepts that greater integration into the global economy is a key aspect in 
 
37 UK House of Commons, International Development Committee, Fair Trade? The European Union’s 
Trade Agreements with African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries’ (HC 68, 6 April 2005) at para. 6. 
38 Declaration of the ACP Council of Ministers at its 86th Session Expressing Serious Concern of the 
Status of the Negotiations of the Economic Partnership Agreements (ACP/25/013/07, 13 December 
2007). 
39 Ibid. 
40 ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution on Economic Partnerships (EPAs) and their 
impact on ACP states, 6-9 April 2009 (ACP-EU/100.463/A/p9/FIN) at para. J. 
41 Ibid., Article 3(a). 
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promoting development (a premise which is not without criticism),42 it is likely that the 
benefits of opening up developing country markets are rarely automatic but dependent 
upon endogenous capacity-building, developmental assistance (particularly in areas 
such as infrastructure and other supply-side constraints) and flexibility in 
implementation. In addition, it must be remembered that liberalisation results in 
reduction in much-needed governmental revenue through the imposition of import 
tariffs, something which developing countries will need help to adjust to over both the 
short- and medium-term.43 Moreover, one can point to the rather blunt nature of 
asymmetrical reciprocity; longer run-in times and variable geometry in the scope of 
binding commitments will not necessarily, in themselves, be sufficient to 
accommodation the special concerns and considerations of developing countries. While 
the EU would seem to recognise the importance of such matters (such as endorsing an 
aid-for-trade financial package),44 its preferred method is to consider these issues “off 
table” and certainly, as far as possible, not within the text of the EPAs themselves. The 
concern is that the economically and politically weaker ACP states have little choice 
but to accept this negotiating stance. This point is particularly acute considering the 
lack of financial and technical support specified in the EPA. A study by the European 
Parliament reported in March 2009 that: 
 
 
42 See generally J. Stiglitz, Making Globalization Work (London: WW Norton & Co, 2007). 
43 See generally PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Sustainability Impact Assessment of the EU-ACP Economic 
Partnership Agreements (May 2007), online: SIA-ACP <http://www.sia-
acp.org/acp/download/20070516-Rapport-SIA-EU-ACP-UK.pdf>; CEPII, An Impact Study of the EU-
ACP Economic Partnership Agreements in the Six ACP Regions (January 2008), online: 
<http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/workpap/summaries/2008/wp08-04.htm>; and South Centre, EPAs 
and Development Assistance: Rebalancing Rights and Obligations (September 2008), online: 
<http://www.southcentre.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=902>. 
44 See EC, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Economic 
Partnership Agreements (COM (2007) 635 final, 23 October 2007) at para. 5: “Full EPAs will allow 
EDF funding to be directed towards the range of adjustment needs arising from commitments taken by 
ACP countries and will help establish priorities for additional funding from Member States.” 
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“Although EU donors have made commitments that appear to be adequate 
there is no guarantee that they will be applied in an appropriate and timely 
way – and there is complete uncertainty over the funds for EPA support that 
will be committed by the European Commission and EU member States 
beyond 2013.”45 
 
Of particular controversy is the extent to which EPAs should include rules on the so-
called “Singapore issues”, namely foreign direct investment, competition, government 
procurement and trade facilitation. Developing countries have successfully removed 
these issues (apart from trade facilitation) from negotiation at the global trade level 
within the Doha Development Round.46 The EU has been keen to ensure that these 
topics are negotiated within the context of EPAs. Most ACP states, however, have been 
singularly more reticent and defensive about their inclusion.47 They point to the fact 
that the Cotonou Agreement, whilst mentioning these issues, does not require the 
explicit adoption of a comprehensive rule-based framework within EPAs. The wording 
of the Cotonou Agreement simply requires that “general principles on protection and 
promotion of investments” be “introduce[d]” within EPAs.48 In fact, if the underlying 
purpose of EPAs is primarily to ensure compatibility with WTO trade commitments, 
then clearly such negotiations are additional to the core requirements.  
 
 
45 European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies, The CARIFORUM-EU Economic 
Partnership Agreement (EPA): the Development Component (Study) (2009) EXPO/B/DEVE/2008/60 at 
10. 
46 Though included in the initial 2001 Doha Declaration, due to the absence of consensus within the 
WTO membership, these issues were jettisoned in the so-called July 2004 package. 
47 See S. Woolcock, Government Procurement Provisions in CARIFORUM EPA and Lessons for Other 
ACP States (London: LSE, 2008) online:  
<http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/internationalTradePolicyUnit/documents.htm>. 
48 Article 78(3) Cotonou Agreement. 
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More fundamentally, many ACP states are concerned that the inclusion of Singapore 
issues within EPAs jeopardises their overall developmental focus. As one commentator 
noted in evidence to the British Parliamentary investigation, “what [ACP states] fear is 
that the EU will twist their arm to accept with the EPAs things they would never have 
to accept on a more level playing field.”49 Moreover, the ongoing negotiation and 
conclusion of interim EPAs with a number of regional groupings and individual states 
is entirely due to the fact that these ACP states have so far refused to agree rules on, 
amongst other things, the Singapore issues. Nevertheless, the incorporation of so-called 
rendez-vous provisions within these interim agreements, setting forth areas (such as 
investment liberalisation) to be included in the subsequent negotiations towards the 
conclusion of comprehensive EPAs,50 against the general wishes of ACP negotiators, 
again indicates both the wariness of ACP states to negotiate on these issues as well as 
the unequal bargaining strength of the EU. 
 
Of particular note is the ACP Investment Facility under the Cotonou Agreement, by 
which 2.2 billion euros were allocated for projects aimed at strengthening the private 
sector in ACP states between 2003 and 2008. At the outset, the institution responsible, 
the European Investment Bank (EIB), clearly saw the investment provisions in the ACP 
in terms of both trade and development: 
 
 
49 Supra note 37 at para. 25 (evidence submitted by Dr Christopher Stevens, Research Fellow, Institute 
of Development Studies). 
50 European Centre for Development Policy Management, State of EPA Negotiations in January 2009: 
Briefing Note (Maastricht: ECDPM, 2009), online: 
FES<http://www.fes.de/cotonou/DocumentsEN/ThematicFocus/trade_finance_economy/StateofEPAne
gotiations.pdf> at 1: “In parallel to the preparations for signature of the interim agreements, throughout 
2008 negotiations towards comprehensive regional EPAs have been taking place in all regions, in line 
with the rendez-vous clauses contained in the interim deals. These clauses specify areas in which 
negotiations are to be held, in particular relating to trade in services and trade related issues, and in most 
cases set a deadline for concluding these by the end of 2008… However, at this point it seems very likely 
that work towards full EPAs may stretch into 2009 in all regions.” 
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“The significance of Cotonou is that it sees poverty reduction as dependent 
on economic growth, and economic growth dependent in turn on better 
governance and greater integration into the world market economy. 
Through our joint signing of Cotonou, we all recognize that the target has 
to be a fuller participation in the multilateral trading system to raise 
standards of living in the ACP, while minimizing the adverse affects and 
creating new opportunities for the most vulnerable. And all is so much 
dependent on development of the private sector.”51 
 
The debate over the inclusion of investment within the EPAs is therefore not 
unsurprising. If, as noted above, there is a general debate about how far and how quickly 
developing countries should be integrated into the global economy on a level of 
reasonable parity, differences in viewpoint become ever more intense when viewed 
from the perspective of the regulation and liberalisation of foreign direct investment. 
Investment provisions, along with those on services, vary greatly between the 
CARIFORUM states to the extent that the legal, procedural and administrative 
requirements have been termed as “bewildering”.52 Given that only one state in 
CARIFORUM, Haiti, has Least Developed Country status, it can be presumed that the 
complexity of differentiating between the even more diverse states within, for example, 
the ECOWAS or COMESA blocs will be even greater. 
 
While, of course, other international economic issues demand scrutiny over a state’s 
internal system, the extent to which a state should allow foreign investment into its 
 
51 P. Maystadt, Launch of the EIB’s Investment Facility According to the Cotonou Agreement 
(Luxembourg: EIB, 2003), online: EIB 
<http://www.eib.org/attachments/general/events/sp_launch_cotonou_020603.pdf> at 3-4. 
52 European Parliament, supra note 45 at 11. 
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economy, and as importantly on what terms, is a highly sensitive topic.  It raises many 
challenges to the notions of economic independence and economic sovereignty.  
Investment is never just a matter of extra capital being brought into a national economy.  
There is everything else that foreign investment entails: greater foreign interference in 
national economic matters, a culture of dependency on foreign capital, possible influx 
of foreign personnel, profits potentially flowing out of the country rather than being 
reinvested within it.  These challenges become more acute when the foreign investment 
occurs in highly politicised areas of a national economy (such as infrastructure, power 
generation and some aspects of the service sector).  From a developmental perspective, 
therefore, investment policy inevitably polarises an already strained debate. As one 
non-governmental organisation has clearly noted,  
 
“[t]he EU and ACP countries agree on the potential value of investment and 
of sound, well-functioning regulatory regimes for development. What is in 
dispute is the added value of a rules-based investment agreement between 
the regions. Many ACP states already have ongoing domestic reforms 
relating to their investment regimes. The added value of an ACP-EC 
agreement could only be the EC’s belief that it would ensure 
implementation and ‘locking in’ of reforms – thus increasing attractiveness 




53 M. Masiiwa et al., EPAs and Investment (Christian Aid, 2006), online: Christian Aid 
<http://www.christianaid.org.uk/Images/epas_and_investment.pdf> at 6. 
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The same report is however sceptical of such value: “[d]eveloping countries want to 
attract inward investment, and manage such investment through regulation to minimise 
costs and maximise benefits. The usefulness of binding international rules on 
investment for developing countries is controversial, as they tend to limit these policy 
choices and do little to attract new investment.”54 Thus, the remainder of this chapter 
focuses on the first (and, at the time of writing, the only) full EPA that has so far been 
signed – between the EU and the CARIFORUM states – and specifically on its rules on 




Unlike many ACP states, the CARIFORUM states55 were, as a whole, more willing to 
engage in comprehensive negotiations, in particular on investment and cross-border 
services.56 To that extent, the very process of regional EPA negotiations has fragmented 
any semblance of ACP global policy coherence; those more cynical would note the 
EU’s ability to strengthen its own position by undertaking disparate negotiations with 
 
54 Ibid. at 9. 
55 CARIFORUM covers members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) (Antigua and Barbuda, 
Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint 
Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago) and the Dominican 
Republic.  
56 Cf. Traidcraft, First Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) is Signed Amid Confusion (Traidcraft, 
2008), online: <http://www.traidcraft.co.uk/news_and_events/news/first_deal_signed.htm>: “The first 
EPA was signed between the EU and 13 Caribbean countries on 15th October 2008. The disarray 
surrounding the signing shows the extent of their unpopularity in the region and the pressure that the EU 
had to resort to in order to secure agreement. The signing was postponed several times after 
parliamentarians, leading academics and civil society organisations across the Caribbean voiced their 
concerns over the effects the deals would have on development.  Of the 13 countries that finally signed 
the deal, several made it clear that they did so to prevent damaging tariffs which the EU was threatening 
to inflict on crucial exports such as bananas.  Haiti did not sign at all and The Bahamas reportedly signed 
only part of the deal. The EU refused Guyana's request to sign a goods-only deal and tightened the screws 
by gearing up to impose taxes that could devastate their sugar industry. But Guyana held fast and did not 
sign yesterday, citing fundamental concerns about the deal's impact on development. It is likely Guyana 
will sign later this month.  The EU's tactics – led by former Commissioner Mandelson - have severely 
damaged relationships with the Caribbean and have sent shockwaves through African and Pacific 
countries that are still negotiating.” 
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different regional groupings.57 Whilst the regional groupings are loosely based on pre-
existing regional integration schemes, this does not necessarily help their bargaining 
position. In particular, the EPA is concluded with the Caribbean states acting 
collectively under the name of CARIFORUM, rather than as the Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM) as a regional bloc. It is unclear as to whether CARICOM (not a party in 
itself to the EPA and including only 14 of the 15 states covered by the EPA) can 
represent the states in their dealings with the European Commission. This potentially 
opens the door to CARIFORUM states competing with each other, causing regional 
disintegration rather than integration, thus undermining one of the stated aims of the 
EPA.58 
 
As regards the provisions on investment in the CARIFORUM-EU EPA, it is important 
to note certain background factors that undoubtedly influenced the negotiations. First, 
as already noted, unlike many ACP states, there was a willingness amongst many of the 
CARIFORUM governments to negotiate on investment issues. In fact, as an analysis 
of the EPA notes, “CARIFORUM is by far the most service-centric partner of all those 
the EU is currently negotiating with.”59 More specifically, it seems that these states 
“were in fact highly comfortable in negotiating on investment issues and exploiting the 
potential ‘signalling’ properties of negotiating advances in this area.”60 This is perhaps 
 
57 South Centre, supra note 43 at para. 103: “The European Union’s Commission must recognize that the 
problems that have arisen as a result of the negotiations – the internal splintering of ACP regions, the 
lack of ACP countries signing before the deadline, and the concerns continually brought up by ACP 
negotiators – as indications of the problematic issues inherent within the EPAs.” 
58 H. Brewster, N. Girvan & V. Lewis, “Renegotiate the CARIFORUM EPA” (2008) 7:3 Trade 
Negotiation Insights, online: ICTSD <http://ictsd.net/i/news/10687>. 
59 P. Sauvé & N. Ward, The EC-CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement: Assessing the 
Outcome on Services and Investment (Brussels: European Centre for International Political Economy, 
2009), online: ECIPE <http://www.ecipe.org/publications/ecipe-working-papers/the-ec-cariform-
economic-partnership-agreement-assessing-the-outcome-on-services-and-investment/PDF> at 14. 
60 Ibid. at 15. Later on (at 57), the same authors also note that “the perception that BITs provided more 
rights than obligations to investors led CARIFORUM countries to use the EPA to embed greater rights 
for host countries.”  
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an overly generous assessment of the situation; certainly, a number of CARIFORUM 
states had (and continue to have) significant reservations over the entire EPA process.61 
 
Second, and building upon the previous point, CARIFORUM states had in fact sought 
to take investment negotiations further to include not only matters of market access and 
liberalisation – the topics that were eventually to form the core of the final investment 
commitments – but also issues on investment protection and promotion. These topics 
are, however, largely beyond the current competence of the EU, as the application of 
its common commercial policy to investment is presently restricted. In fact, it will only 
be with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon that specific mention of foreign 
direct investment will enter into EU treaty vocabulary.62 Up to this point, investment 
negotiations have been undertaken under the guise of the international trade 
competence63 and even then member state approval is required due to its “mixed” 
nature.64  
 
Thus, it will be for any bilateral investment treaties (BITs) agreed between individual 
Caribbean and European states to continue to determine matters such as expropriation 
and compensation, and the possibility of recourse to international arbitration.65 To that 
 
61 For instance, see Article 63 CARIFORUM-EU EPA, concerning the application of the investment and 
service provisions to the Bahamas and the Haiti. 
62 Eilmansberger, supra note 6 at 394; S. Woolcock, “The Potential Impact of the Lisbon Treaty on 
European Union External Trade Policy” (2008) 8 European Policy Analysis, online: Swedish Institute 
for European Policy Studies <http://www.lissabonfordraget.se/docs/the-potential-impact-of-the-lt-on-
eu-external-trade-policy-epa_nr.8_2008.pdf>. 
63 Namely, Article 133 EC. 
64 Essentially, the “mixed” nature refers to the reliance on competences granted to the EU institutions 
and those retained by the member states. For a comprehensive analysis of how and why mixed 
agreements have arisen, see P. Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law (Oxford: Hart, 2006) at 
chapter 4. 
65 Footnote to Article 66 CARIFORUM-EU EPA. Moreover, as van Harten has noted, the lack of an 
investor-state dispute mechanism may not prevent the market access commitments from being used by 
European investors to trigger arbitration proceedings: “This exposes CARIFORUM states to major 
liabilities arising from the prospect of direct claims by investors and damages awards against the state. 
Such claims may arise in any sector with substantial foreign ownership and are particularly prevalent in 
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extent, existing BITs will remain extremely relevant to many aspects of foreign direct 
investment between these parties. Moreover, the EPA contains no minimum standard 
of treatment rules;66 as will be noted below, the EPA’s provisions on post-establishment 
regulatory conduct are both limited and potentially qualified in nature. The EPA’s focus 
is investment liberalisation: through market access,  national treatment, and the 
application of the most-favoured-nation (MFN) concept. 
 
Third, as with trade obligations, investment and service commitments are asymmetrical 
in nature67 (as set out in Annex IV to the EPA). In summarising the level of these 
commitments, the European Commission notes that “the EU opens up for investment 
to a much wider extent than Cariforum countries do towards the EU. Cariforum applies 
many more conditions and limitations to a more limited sectoral coverage.”68 And in 
relation to cross-border services, the Commission calculates that the EU “makes 
commitments in 94% of sectors while CARIFORUM does so, on average, in 75% of 
sectors.”69 As an aside, it should be noted that unlike the GATS, but like NAFTA, the 
investment rules cover both service and non-service economic activities (referred to as 
“commercial presence”) in title II, chapter II; cross-border services are regulated 
separately (in title II, chapter III) though many of the basic precepts remain the same. 
 
 
the energy and resource sectors and in privatized sectors.” G. van Harten, Investment Provisions in 
Economic Partnership Agreements (Toronto: York University, 2008), online:  
<http://osgoode.yorku.ca/osgmedia.nsf/0/D1A4A0AAD421D8E385257563006DDB98/$FILE/Investm
ent%20provisions%20in%20EPAs.pdf>. 
66 For instance, rules on expropriation and fair and equitable treatment. On investment protection, see 
generally S. Subedi, International Investment Law (Oxford: Hart, 2008). 
67 The list of commitments made under the commercial presence chapter is set out in Annex IV to the 
CARIFORUM-EU EPA. 
68 EC, CARIFORUM-EC EPA: Investment, online: 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/october/tradoc_140979.pdf> at 1. 
69 EC, CARIFORUM-EC EPA: Trade in Services, online: 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/october/tradoc_140974.pdf> at 1. 
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Though it is not possible to discuss all the investment provisions of the EU- 
CARIFORUM EPA, certain aspects are clearly worth highlighting. First, the EPA does 
not adopt a comprehensive definition of investment, but rather is based upon the notion 
of “commercial presence”,70 which is either the “constitution, acquisition or 
maintenance of a juridical person”71 (which itself requires the establishment or 
maintenance of “lasting economic links”72) or “the creation or maintenance of a branch 
or representative office … for the purpose of performing an economic activity”73 
(which itself is defined as having “the appearance of permanency”).74 Highly volatile 
share dealings – sometimes considered as foreign direct investment in certain contexts 
but which would be unlikely to support the host country’s long-term development – 
would fall outside this definition. 
 
Second, the contracting Parties agree to open up only those sectors listed in their 
schedules of commitments – and this after taking into account those sectors which are 
ex ante excluded.75 Within those schedules, Parties may set out limitations and 
qualifications, both in relation to market access and the obligation of national treatment. 
Moreover, these qualifications may be not just those current non-conforming measures 
which states wish to retain but also where states wish to post a reservation as to the 
 
70 Article 65(a) CARIFORUM-EU EPA: “‘commercial presence’ means any type of business or 
professional establishment”. The definition of “investor” is equally tied to the notion as an “investor” is 
“any natural or juridical person that performs an economic activity through setting up a commercial 
presence” (Article 65(b), emphasis added). 
71 Article 65(a)(i) CARIFORUM-EU EPA. 
72 Footnote to Article 65(a)(i) CARIFORUM-EU EPA: “When the juridical person has the status of a 
company limited by shares, there is a lasting economic link where the block of shares held enables the 
shareholder…to participate effectively in the management of the company or in its control. Long-term 
loans of a participating nature are loans for a period of more than five years which are made for the 
purpose of establishing or maintaining lasting economic links.” 
73 Article 65(a)(ii) CARIFORUM-EU EPA. 
74 Article 65(f) CARIFORUM-EU EPA. 
75 Article 66 CARIFORUM-EU EPA. Exceptions include the “mining, manufacturing and processing of 
nuclear materials” and the “production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material.” 
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possibility of enacting future non-conforming regulations. The view expressed in one 
recent review – that “[l]iberalisation will therefore principally be achieved through the 
binding of existing regulatory practice and the resulting limitations on future attempts 
to close the door further to foreign investors”76 – is thus limited by speculative 
reservations as to future regulatory conduct that the schedules may include. 
 
Thus, in those sectors where market access commitments are agreed, Parties commit 
themselves to a range of obligations, subject to whatever qualifications they have 
included.77 These obligations are to “not maintain or adopt” (i) limitations on the 
number of commercial presences, (ii) limitations on the total value of transactions or 
assets, (iii) limitations on the total number of operations or on the total quantity of 
output, (iv) limitations on the participation of foreign capital, and (v) measures which 
restrict or require specific types of commercial presence.78 As regards national 
treatment, subject to the scheduling of non-conforming measures, parties guarantee to 
each other “treatment no less favourable than that they accord to their own like 
commercial presences and investors.”79 
 
Third, and often viewed as one of the most controversial provisions, is the MFN 
obligation. Despite the controversy, the CARIFORUM-EU EPA highlights that it is 
possible to negotiate a highly asymmetrical commitment in this regard. In particular, 
while the EU commits to providing CARIFORUM states the same rights and privileges 
 
76 T. Westcott, “Investment Provisions and Commitments in the CARIFORUM-EU EPA” (2008) 7:9 
Trade Negotiations Insights, online:  ICTSD <http://ictsd.net/i/news/tni/32972>. 
77 Article 67(1) CARIFORUM-EU EPA: “[the respective states] shall accord to commercial presences 
and investors of the other Party a treatment no less favourable than that provided for in the specific 
commitments contained in Annex IV.” 
78 Article 67(2) CARIFORUM-EU EPA. 
79 Article 68 CARIFORUM-EU EPA. 
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as it gives to any third country with which it negotiates a future economic integration 
agreement with improved terms,80 the MFN obligations on CARIFORUM states is 
significantly less extensive. First, CARIFORUM states are not obliged to give the EU 
MFN status unless they negotiate a future economic integration agreement with a 
“major trading economy” (rather than simply with any third party).81 Moreover, the 
grant of MFN to EU member states is not automatic but will be subject to 
“consultations” between the relevant EU and CARIFORUM parties.82 Second, 
CARIFORUM states are not required to grant MFN status to EU member states where 
the increased liberalisation is the result of greater regional integration amongst the 
CARIFORUM states themselves.83 In short, the asymmetry has led some to wonder 
whether the EPA “reduces the MFN commitment to almost zero.”84 Others, however, 
still remain concerned that the very existence of the inclusion of an MFN provision 
exacerbates the economic disparity between the parties still further.85 Moreover, as it is 
possible that the larger developing country economies, such as Brazil, may fall within 
the definition of “major trading economy”,86 such an MFN provision might also 
undermine South-South liberalisation if the EU were able to take advantage of greater 
rights given to other countries in the region.87 
 
80 Article 70(1)(a) CARIFORUM-EU EPA. 
81 Article 70(1)(b) CARIFORUM-EU EPA. 
82 Article 70(5) CARIFORUM-EU EPA: “The Parties may decide whether the concerned Signatory 
CARIFORUM State may deny the more favourable treatment contained in the economic integration 
agreement to the EC Party.” 
83 Article 70(2) CARIFORUM-EU EPA. 
84 Westcott, supra note 76. 
85 M. Stichele, ACP Regionalism: Thwarted by EPAs and Interim Agreements on Services and 
Investments (SOMO, 2007), online: SOMO <http://somo.nl/publications-en/Publication_2530/view> at 
2: “The EC’s proposed definition of regional integration is extremely narrow. It limits the potential for 
ACP regions to derogate from ‘most favoured nation’ treatment vis-à-vis the EU – as proposed by the 
EC.” 
86 Article 70(4) CARIFORUM-EU EPA. 
87 In fact, the issue will often have less to do with concerns within CARIFORUM states but with the 
other states in the region. See Sauvé & Ward, supra note 59 at 14-15: “Brazil, in particular, has expressed 
concern in the WTO in the WTO General Council that the insertion of such a provision into the 
CARIFORUM EPA and the interim EPAs may have the effect of discouraging countries from concluding 
[preferential trade agreements] with EPA partners. … Neither CARIFORUM nor EC officials appear to 
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Fourth, in what was clearly a “win” for CARIFORUM states, the EPA includes a 
singularly important provision on investor behaviour.88 Though the EU had been 
prepared to consider general wording, perhaps of a more preambular kind, the final 
result was a legally binding provision. The provision is worth quoting extensively: “The 
EC Party and the Signatory CARIFORUM States shall cooperate and take, within their 
own respective territories, such measures as may be necessary, inter alia, through 
domestic legislation, to ensure that:” (a) investors “are forbidden from, and held liable 
for, offering, promising or giving any undue pecuniary or other advantage” for the 
purposes of bribing or corrupting public officials; (b) investors “act in accordance with 
[International Labour Organization] core labour standards”; (c) investors act in a way 
that does not “circumvent … international environmental or labour obligations”; and 
(d) investors ”establish and maintain, where appropriate, local community liaison 
processes, especially in projects involving extensive natural resource-based 
activities.”89 As another review of the EPA notes, “[i]t bears noting that the above 
provisions were insisted into the EPA at the behest of CARIFORUM.”90 This is itself 
telling both as to the EU’s own negotiating priorities and its regard for the values 
inherent within the Cotonou Agreement. It is unclear how far the EU will adopt legal 
measures to regulate extra-territorially the activities of its private investors in the 
CARIFORUM region.  
 
 
find Brazil’s arguments persuasive. CARIFORUM officials contend that major developing trading 
partners are unlikely to match the terms of the EPA.” 
88 The inclusion of such a provision is still quite novel. However, see also Article 32 of Norway’s Model 
Bilateral Investment Treaty: “The Parties agree to encourage investors to conduct their investment 
activities in compliance with the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and to participate in 
the United Nations Global Compact.” 
89 Article 72 CARIFORUM-EU EPA. 
90 Sauvé & Ward, supra note 59 at 15.  
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Moreover, some might go further and suggest the unwillingness of the EU proactively 
to seek such a substantive provision is an indictment of both the EU’s commitment to 
sustainable development in its own legal framework,91 as well as political statements to 
the same effect.92 As a firmly embedded global value, sustainable development seeks 
the integration of economic, social and environmental considerations. One might 
therefore have reasonably expected any recently negotiated international text – 
especially that agreed between North and South – to be increasingly progressive in its 
content. The final version of the CARIFORM EPA is thus arguably a significant 
development, the future implementation of which should be studied closely. But 
equally significant is the reticence by which the EU was prepared to agree to such an 
integrated approach. Of course, the text of the treaty should be considered as a whole 
in this regard and it is unfortunately not the purpose of this chapter to undertake this.93 
However, on this single matter alone, the EU’s approach to sustainable development 





91 See, for instance, Article 6 EC: “Environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the 
definition and implementation of the Community policies and activities referred to in Article 3, in 
particular with a view to promoting sustainable development”. 
92 See EC, Introduction to the CARIFORUM-EU EPA, on-line:  
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/october/tradoc_141029.pdf>: “Some of the key aspects of 
the development dimension [include] • Making sustainable development the overarching objective of the 
EPA…• Ensuring specific provisions address key sustainable development issues, such as eco-
innovation, social issues and the environment;…• Guaranteeing each signatory the right to regulate 
economic activity on their territory, particularly as regards services, investment and measure”. 
93 See Article 60 CARIFORUM-EU EPA: “The Parties and the Signatory CARIFORUM States, 
reaffirming their commitments under the WTO Agreement and with a view to facilitating the regional 
integration and sustainable development of the Signatory CARIFORUM States and their smooth and 
gradual integration in the world economy, hereby lay down the necessary arrangements for the 
progressive, reciprocal and asymmetric liberalisation of investment and trade in services and for 
cooperation on e-commerce”. 
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So, in conclusion, how should one view the investment obligations in the 
CARIFORUM-EU EPA? If one is prepared to accept the argument that foreign direct 
investment – and more specifically, an approach that focuses upon investment 
liberalisation rather than simply the provision of legal certainty through the negotiation 
of investment protection provisions – can contribute positively to long-term 
development, is the CARIFORUM model one to be followed again, perhaps in the first 
instance in other regional EPAs? 
 
Certainly, there are interesting elements, including (i) a circumscribed definition of 
investment, (ii) legitimising variable liberalisation between the parties (as permitted, 
inter alia, through asymmetrical binding of commitments and qualifications and 
divergences in the application of the MFN obligation), (iii) permitting parties to reserve 
future regulatory conduct in selected sectors, and (iv) regulating investor behaviour. 
 
However, what must be remembered is that the CARIFORUM states were, if not 
unanimous on the scope of the EPA, generally willing to include investment within that 
scope. Moreover, CARIFORUM states have also benefited from an Aid for Trade (AfT) 
assistance package which, though outside the text of the EPA, is central to its effective 
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implementation.94 Significant questions remain about the positioning of financing 
arrangements of the EPAs and what this tells us about EU priorities.95 
 
Other states, certainly those which have less experience in the service sector and a 
different history towards foreign direct investment, are likely to be less willing to adopt 
such a rule-based liberalisation approach. Many developing countries are likely to want 
to endorse a much more cooperative framework, first building up local capacity and 
governance capability. If legal rules are to be negotiated, their principal focus should 
be upon development and technical assistance, as well as (if appropriate) much greater 
asymmetry in commitments and significant flexibility in implementation. In fact, 
investment liberalisation in an EPA may be simply premature if it has not yet been 
grounded at the regional or sub-regional level.96 Nevertheless, for members of the ACP, 
other than the CARIFORUM states, the EU is adamant that investment liberalisation is 
 
94 C. Sinckler (Minister for Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and International Business in Barbados at the 
time of the signature of the EPA), “The Dawn of a New Wra: Caribbean Signs EPA with EU” (2008) 7:9 
Trade Negotiations Insights, online: ICTSD<http://ictsd.net/i/news/tni/33013>: “The EU Aid for Trade 
(AfT) facility represents an important source of additional funding for the implementation of a 
CARIFORUM EPA. The EU AfT commitment envisages increasing trade related development support 
to 2 billion euros per year by 2010 with half of these resources being earmarked for EPA implementation 
in ACP regions. The CARIFORUM EPA text includes a declaration that the region will benefit from an 
equitable share of the 1 billion euros, which represents the commitments of EU member states (not 
including the Commission) for EPA implementation. But it must be pointed out that to date, the 
modalities governing access to the AfT resources of EU member states have not yet been properly 
elaborated despite the fact that these were to have been in place since the end of last year. Moreover, 
questions have been raised about the actual amount of net additional AfT resources, which will be 
available. I am optimistic these concerns will be immediately addressed. Failure to satisfactorily do so 
or to meet those commitments to their fullest extent will not only compromise the implementation of this 
agreement but permanently damage our future relations.” 
95 South Centre, supra note 43 at para. 105: “In this sense, it is unfortunate that development cooperation 
provisions, both financial and non-financial, to support the implementation of the texts agreed to are 
barely developed, if not absent from the EPA legal text. The details of development cooperation 
instruments (e.g. Regional EPA Funds) remain to be negotiated at a later stage. Other instruments cited 
(e.g. EDF) are not linked in a binding manner to the costs of implementing or adjusting to interim 
agreements.” 
96 Much depends upon the EPA negotiations themselves. As Sauvé & Ward rightly note (supra note 59 
at 56), “there is nothing automatic in securing such an outcome and it requires vigilance at the negotiating 
table. African countries must be clear about their development strategy, place themselves in a position 
to articulate such a strategy and allow it to inform the development thrust contained in an EPA’s services 
and investment chapters.” Though undoubtedly true, whether this sufficiently takes into account the 
disparity in bargaining position between the parties is to be questioned.  
Deleted: 42
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essential to ACP development. But just as the benefits to ACP states (and developing 
countries, generally) of liberalising foreign direct investment are rarely capable of being 
identified a priori as inherently positive, the success of the model for investment 
liberalisation being advocated is often similarly hard to predict.  
 
